On the new initiative for responsible space behaviors proposed by United Kingdom, United States, and other states

First, authors review the main contents of new initiative for responsible space behaviors. Overall, there are common recognitions among States regarding “respecting the authority of the existing international law” and “preventing an arms race in outer space to avoid miscalculations and escalation of tension”. Specifically, in addition to call on “the further development and implementation of norms, rules and principles of responsible behaviors”, the preamble also addresses three focal issues of space debris, cyber interference, and verification methods: 1) The resolution “stresses that the creation of long-lived orbital debris arising from the deliberate destruction of space systems increases the risk of in-orbit collisions and the potential for misunderstanding and miscalculations that could lead to conflict”; 2) The resolution “stresses that uses of these technologies and means for purposes inconsistent with the objectives of maintaining international stability and security, including against signals for operators and users and the terrestrial infrastructure supporting space systems, can lead to the perception of threats and can have destabilising effects on peace and security on Earth, and that such threats already exist in outer space and on Earth”; 3) The resolution is “cognizant of the challenges of effectively verifying the capabilities of space objects, which can have both civilian and military applications, interpreting their behaviors or determining whether the systems will be used for purposes inconsistent with the objectives of maintaining international security and stability, while reaffirming that verification is one of the essential components of all arms control instruments”. Besides, the operative section of the resolution consists of seven articles, mainly including three initiatives that respectively are to identify threats and risks, to characterize threats and risks (responsible or irresponsible), and to propose suggestions to reduce the risk of misperception and miscalculations. The fifth paragraph is the core content, which can be concluded as a three-step approach, “identifying threats - characterising threats (responsible/irresponsible) - formulating corresponding rules (proposing specific initiatives).”

Then, authors cast preliminary perspectives on new initiative for responsible space behaviors. The “New Initiative for Responsible Space Behaviors” appears to focus on reducing misperception and miscalculations in space, and maintaining peace and security in space, as a result of which it has gained the supports of most developing countries. However, the dichotomy of “responsible/irresponsible” has strongly political sense and was indicated in the space security policies of the United States in 2020, which highly assume China and Russia as “hypothetical enemies.” This initiative gives a tool to the states who sponsored this initiative, the United States and its allies, against disagreeing states. First, potential threats and security risks should be identified. Assuming “threats” and “responsible/irresponsible behaviors” were identified strongly politically, the proposed space norms would focus on how to contain “imaginary enemies” of certain countries to eliminate the so-called “threats and risks” brought by “imaginary enemies”. This would blur the boundary between the regulatory demands of international space security governance and the space priority that a certain State intends to pursue and undermine the due strategic equilibrium of space rules as well. Second, States should focus on issues of space security and PAROS under this Initiative so as to avoid the overlaps with other platforms or initiatives under UN framework. Some are beyond the ambit of the topic of arms control in outer space, for instance, national supervision, space debris mitigation and other space environmental governance, coordinated notification and collision avoidance in normal orbital operations, management of low-orbit large constellations, and spectrum allocation. Otherwise, it would unnecessarily increase the cost of discussions and cause a waste of diplomatic resources of States. Third, there are reconsiderations on the dichotomy of “responsible/irresponsible”. (1) the “responsible/irresponsible” approach is less workable and practical in terms of space global governance since it is a parochial approach rather than a global one; (2) the “responsible/irresponsible” approach would cause confusions with respect to the context of existing legal terms; (3) the “responsible/irresponsible” dichotomy might inappropriately change the nature of soft laws, such as best practices, guidelines, and codes of conduct.

Finally, authors suggest the way forward and draw the conclusion. As for legal uncertainties of the governance of space security, one of the urgent and major challenges is the unclear applicability of international law in terms of space security governance, and the applicability of general international law in space security domain is uncertain either. It is necessary for all States to commence in-depth discussions on the interpretation of relevant laws and their applicability in that they are the prerequisite to have common recognition of legal uncertainties, challenges, and loopholes, which subsequently serve as the basis to consider drafting complementary rules or new ones. Therefore, the core of the discussion at this stage should not be about the distinction between “responsible” and “irresponsible” behaviors, but should be the interpretation of existing international law, including space law, international telecommunication law, and general international law, such as the law of State responsibility and the law of use of force. Only through the approach of “interpreting rules - formulating rules” can the international community effectively respond to the problems and challenges faced in space security domain and find relevant normative solutions. It is concluded that it would be difficult to achieve the international political and legal consensus on space security and arms control in outer space by identifying “responsible/irresponsible” space behaviors. States should work together, compromise, and be pragmatic to work on a resolution to not only reflect the demands of all parties in a balanced manner but also effectively prevent an arms race and conflicts in space.

First, authors review the main contents of new initiative for responsible space behaviors. Overall, there are common recognitions among States regarding “respecting the authority of the existing international law” and “preventing an arms race in outer space to avoid miscalculations and escalation of tension”. Specifically, in addition to call on “the further development and implementation of norms, rules and principles of responsible behaviors”, the preamble also addresses three focal issues of space debris, cyber interference, and verification methods: 1) The resolution “stresses that the creation of long-lived orbital debris arising from the deliberate destruction of space systems increases the risk of in-orbit collisions and the potential for misunderstanding and miscalculations that could lead to conflict”; 2) The resolution “stresses that uses of these technologies and means for purposes inconsistent with the objectives of maintaining international stability and security, including against signals for operators and users and the terrestrial infrastructure supporting space systems, can lead to the perception of threats and can have destabilising effects on peace and security on Earth, and that such threats already exist in outer space and on Earth”; 3) The resolution is “cognizant of the challenges of effectively verifying the capabilities of space objects, which can have both civilian and military applications, interpreting their behaviors or determining whether the systems will be used for purposes inconsistent with the objectives of maintaining international security and stability, while reaffirming that verification is one of the essential components of all arms control instruments”. Besides, the operative section of the resolution consists of seven articles, mainly including three initiatives that respectively are to identify threats and risks, to characterize threats and risks (responsible or irresponsible), and to propose suggestions to reduce the risk of misperception and miscalculations. The fifth paragraph is the core content, which can be concluded as a three-step approach, “identifying threats - characterising threats (responsible/irresponsible) - formulating corresponding rules (proposing specific initiatives).”

Then, authors cast preliminary perspectives on new initiative for responsible space behaviors. The “New Initiative for Responsible Space Behaviors” appears to focus on reducing misperception and miscalculations in space, and maintaining peace and security in space, as a result of which it has gained the supports of most developing countries. However, the dichotomy of “responsible/irresponsible” has strongly political sense and was indicated in the space security policies of the United States in 2020, which highly assume China and Russia as “hypothetical enemies.” This initiative gives a tool to the states who sponsored this initiative, the United States and its allies, against disagreeing states. First, potential threats and security risks should be identified. Assuming “threats” and “responsible/irresponsible behaviors” were identified strongly politically, the proposed space norms would focus on how to contain “imaginary enemies” of certain countries to eliminate the so-called “threats and risks” brought by “imaginary enemies”. This would blur the boundary between the regulatory demands of international space security governance and the space priority that a certain State intends to pursue and undermine the due strategic equilibrium of space rules as well. Second, States should focus on issues of space security and PAROS under this Initiative so as to avoid the overlaps with other platforms or initiatives under UN framework. Some are beyond the ambit of the topic of arms control in outer space, for instance, national supervision, space debris mitigation and other space environmental governance, coordinated notification and collision avoidance in normal orbital operations, management of low-orbit large constellations, and spectrum allocation. Otherwise, it would unnecessarily increase the cost of discussions and cause a waste of diplomatic resources of States. Third, there are reconsiderations on the dichotomy of “responsible/irresponsible”. (1) the “responsible/irresponsible” approach is less workable and practical in terms of space global governance since it is a parochial approach rather than a global one; (2) the “responsible/irresponsible” approach would cause confusions with respect to the context of existing legal terms; (3) the “responsible/irresponsible” dichotomy might inappropriately change the nature of soft laws, such as best practices, guidelines, and codes of conduct.

Finally, authors suggest the way forward and draw the conclusion. As for legal uncertainties of the governance of space security, one of the urgent and major challenges is the unclear applicability of international law in terms of space security governance, and the applicability of general international law in space security domain is uncertain either. It is necessary for all States to commence in-depth discussions on the interpretation of relevant laws and their applicability in that they are the prerequisite to have common recognition of legal uncertainties, challenges, and loopholes, which subsequently serve as the basis to consider drafting complementary rules or new ones. Therefore, the core of the discussion at this stage should not be about the distinction between “responsible” and “irresponsible” behaviors, but should be the interpretation of existing international law, including space law, international telecommunication law, and general international law, such as the law of State responsibility and the law of use of force. Only through the approach of “interpreting rules - formulating rules” can the international community effectively respond to the problems and challenges faced in space security domain and find relevant normative solutions. It is concluded that it would be difficult to achieve the international political and legal consensus on space security and arms control in outer space by identifying “responsible/irresponsible” space behaviors. States should work together, compromise, and be pragmatic to work on a resolution to not only reflect the demands of all parties in a balanced manner but also effectively prevent an arms race and conflicts in space.