In a Comment published Online First by The Lancet to coincide with the World Health Assembly (WHA), scientists appeal to the internationally community not to set an arbitrary date for the destruction of the final smallpox-causing variola virus samples held in two high security labs. The authors are concerned that outbreaks are still possible in the future due to bioterrorism or unknown pockets of remaining disease, and that essential countermeasures development work is far from complete. The Comment is by Dr Jean-Vivien Mombouli, National Public Health Laboratory, Brazzaville, Republic of Congo, and Stephen M Ostroff, Bureau of Epidemiology, Pennsylvania Department of Health Harrisburg, PA, USA.
The last naturally occurring case of smallpox occurred in 1977, with WHO declaring it eradicated in 1980. Today, only acknowledged variola virus inventories are held securely at two locations: the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention in the USA and the State Research Centre of Virology and Biotechnology in Russia.
World health leaders will at WHA, again debate whether or not to set a date for the destruction of these final samples. But the authors argue, that, thanks partly due to the existence of these live samples, "Substantial progress in smallpox countermeasures took place over the past decade. New safer vaccines have been developed and more are on the way… Now is not the time to truncate these efforts. Full development of smallpox countermeasures is important not only for global security but also for global public health. Today, more than half of the world's population— and an even higher proportion of Africa's—was born after general smallpox immunisation was stopped around 1980, and therefore has no immunity to smallpox."
They also argue that research is essential to help curb the increasing threat of another smallpox-like disease—monkeypox—that is an increasing threat in parts of Africa, including the Republic of Congo where one of the authors is based.
They conclude: "A release of variola anywhere in the world could cause a global pandemic, and Africa would invariably suffer disproportionately—again… Wishing for luck and hoping for the best were not the strategies used to eradicate smallpox. It was active plans, robust strategy, and clear goals, despite naysayers, setbacks, and risk of failure. The scientists at work on variola countermeasures are guided by the same principles. They have made solid progress but are not yet done. They should be allowed to finish for the good of public health and global security."
Journal
The Lancet